Gallipoli

The book by Les Carlyon

If there is one thing I have learned from this book, it is this: War is an exceptional circumstance, and to pursue it successfully needs some exceptional people with exceptional training and exceptional equipment. In history these three seem to come together very rarely. I hope all political leaders know it as well! And that they realise exceptional people don't occur more than once in each generation.

I had heard the usual story that Gallipoli was a matter of brave and dogged Anzac troops being let down badly by bungling British Officers. After reading Carlyon's version I'm not sure who to blame: but it certainly isn't the rank and file soldier from any country including the Turks.

Certainly most of the generals were incompetent, or lazy, or ill, or shell-shocked, or too institutionalised to tell their superiors the truth. At least one was eccentric or insane; he certainly seems to have been away with the fairies most of the time, until he was finally sacked.

I had known about the landings at Anzac, where the Aussies and NZers got holed up by the Turkish guns on the ridge-tops. What I didn't know was that there were also landings further north at Suvla Bay and further south at the tip of the peninsula, and both involved Anzac troops, as well as Brits, Indians, French and so on. These other beachheads were just as much a failure as the Anzac one.

First because of poor planning, from Downing Street on down. When Plan A failed miserably, the commanders used it again the next day, and the third, losing hundreds each time.

Secondly because of lack of equipment, food, and medical facilities. One general cabled the War Office for more ammunition and was told in effect: this campaign was not planned on the basis that you sit tight and adopt a defensive position. Get up and start moving!

Thirdly because of impossible terrain, where units on the ground got hopelessly lost in broad daylight.

Fourthly because of the old ships the Navy was using in support off-shore, and the admirals' reluctance to take real risks to support army units even in dire situations.

But fundamentally the problems were that everyone was still scrambling to catch up with technological advances. Generals who had trained in the nineteenth century were unfamiliar with twentieth century equipment - and so on.

And it wasn't solved even then. Another book I am reading deals with the Cassino battles in World War II, and it is becoming increasingly clear that even by 1944 there was still a gap between what some modern weapons systems could do and what the humans trying to run the battles understood.

It all does nothing to convince me that war is worthwhile!